Producer motivations for and against engagement in surveillance

Abstract

Aim
A Queensland pilot project aims to explore financial rewards to sustain animal health surveillance.
Background
General or passive surveillance systems depend on producers to monitor, recognise, investigate, refer and/or report instances of unusual health.
Current industry frameworks for biosecurity focus more on risk prevention, impact mitigation and
response preparedness than surveillance. Initiatives in surveillance typically fail to address the
motivations for producer engagement.
Producers perceive insufficient direct benefit from surveillance to invest significant resources. The greatest benefit is in diagnosing enzootic conditions to enhance cost-effective mitigation, but that is offset by a perceived risk of adverse consequences to detection of an emergency disease. Many producers believe that local knowledge and networks can support mitigation of recurrent biosecurity threats without engagement in formal surveillance systems.
Market incentives were demonstrably effective in the adoption of National Vendor Declarations in the late 1990s. In contrast, there are no market incentives for producer engagement in surveillance; in fact there are significant disincentives perceived for investigating or reporting disease incidents, such as the legacy sentiment from regulatory control programs for Johne’s disease. Paradoxically, perceived disincentives are largely social or emotive whereas effective incentives are largely financial.
Until rewarded with higher prices or preferred supply status, meaningful surveillance is unlikely to be sustained beyond the short-term enhancement projects that create interest from time to time.
Method
A motivated and networked local producer group is piloting a quality assurance program based on surveillance performance and outcomes that are relevant to the group and promoted as enhanced quality cattle and beef to the market chain.
Biosecurity Queensland provides support for the project, but the planning and activities are led by the group.
Results
This system is trialling direct market reward for meaningful surveillance, and due to conclude in late 2019. Interim findings will be presented.